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COLLAPSE OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE LEGAL
RESEARCH UNIVERSE: THE IMPERATIVE OF DIGITAL
INFORMATION
Robert C. Berring*
Legal research, in particular the way in which law schools provide
legal research training to first-year law students, is the mom and apple
pie issue of legal education. Everyone is willing to criticize the lack of
it, praise the importance of it, or discuss the reasons it has not been done
so well.1 After all, the whole corpus of legal education is constructed
around Dean Langdell's theory that the law library, the place where the
law student conducts research, is the laboratory of the law,' and the
process of legal research has been intertwined with the process of legal
reasoning that is still the core of legal pedagogy. This is to say nothing
of the popular perception that lawyers know how to find the law. While
most people realize that no lawyer can hold all necessary legal doctrine
inside of her brain, people assume, and expect, that lawyers know how to
find the relevant law.
Given the conceptual centrality of legal research and the popular
perception of its importance, the truly surprising thing about it is that so
little has changed in the teaching of it, or rather that so little in the way of
genuine innovation has been introduced into it intentionally.3 Legal
research training is changing, and changing dramatically, but not through
the planning or action of law schools. These events really place legal
research training at a crossroads, and an issue that is devoted to the work
of Marjorie Dick Rombauer is the perfect place to look at both how the
Professor of Law and Law Librarian, Boalt Hall Law School, University of California at
Berkeley. Special thanks to Kathleen Vanden Heuvel for suggestions and ideas and Tung Yin, Boalt
Hall '95, for rescuing the footnotes.
1. There is continuing literature on the subject of legal research. An excellent, if dated treatment
is Christine A. Brock, Law Libraries and Librarians: A Revisionist History; or More than You Ever
Wanted To Know, 67 Law Libr. J. 325 (1974). Donald J. Dunn, Why Legal Research Skills Declined,
or When Two Rights Make a Wrong, 85 Law Libr. J. 49 (1993), explores the topic through its
competition with legal writing, but his footnotes cover most sources. See also Joyce Manna Janto &
Lucinda D. Harrison-Cox, Teaching Legal Research: Past and Present, 84 Law Libr. J. 281 (1992).
2. Christopher Columbus Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 Law Q. Rev. 123, 124
(Frederick Pollock ed., 1887).
3. See, for example, the works of Fred Hicks. Professor Hicks set out the parameters of most law
school programs and problems 70 years ago. Frederick C. Hicks, The Teaching of Legal
Bibliography, 11 Law Libr. J. 1, 4-8 (1918).
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situation is changing and how Professor Rombauer was well on the way
to the best solution thirty years ago. Professor Rombauer's approach,
incorporating research, writing, and analysis into one coherent stream,
and using full time faculty as instructors, anticipated the need for critical
re-evaluation of the area. Her vision stands as a reminder that the
problem of presenting legal research in a serious, planned curriculum
was both perceived and solved decades ago. But research training
continued to be ignored, or treated with disdain. This Article will
explore why the system could survive so long despite how poorly legal
research training was done and why now, because of a change in the
nature of legal information, solutions like Professor Rombauer's may be
the only hope.
THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
1. The Idea ofLegalAuthority
Before we can explore the change that is occurring in the teaching of
legal research, it is necessary to comprehend the nature of the change in
legal information. Such a first step would be important in any discussion
of subject-specific research training because it would be foolish to
discuss the methodology of research training in any subject area divorced
from that specialty's materials. But such an inquiry has heightened
importance when one approaches law. The law, or at least the law as
legal scholars commonly conceive it, is built around its source materials.
Dean Langdell's use of judicial decisions as the central ingredient in
legal education will be explored below; here it is important to note the
very special way in which legal thinkers and legal practitioners have
viewed published legal materials.
Legal materials have an almost mystical quality for the legal
researcher. This is best exemplified by the fact that legal educators and
lawyers have traditionally believed that law has "primary" sources, that
is, that texts exist which are statements of the law itself. Unlike in a civil
law jurisdiction where one could contend that the language of the code is
the text of the law itself, in common law countries, especially in the
United States, most of this primary authority is found, not in legislation
or constitutions, but in the cases that interpret them or that indeed run
beyond them. These are essentially the written work product of appellate
judges. Yet these decisions of the courts are the stuff of primary
authority. Jacobstein and Mersky's Fundamentals of Legal Research
defines "mandatory authority" as "authority which a given court is bound
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to follow. Mandatory authority is found in constitutional provisions,
legislation and court decisions."4 Another major text in the field, How to
Find the Law, discusses a "research spectrum" which arrays legal
authority on a continuum, with the primary sources at the far left end.'
These texts, reflective of the generally accepted consensus, inform the
student that in law there are basic, findable sources. Each of these
common textbooks then devotes far more space to the consideration of
cases and case finding than to legislation or constitutional law. The
doctrines of the law are built from findable pieces of hard data that
traditionally have been expressed in the form of published judicial
decisions. The point of the search is to locate the nugget of authority that
is out there and use it in constructing one's argument.
Given the significant discussion currently taking place in fields like
cognitive studies about what constitutes authority, and why people rely
on certain authority and not others, the fact that law is still based on a
theory that holds that there are final sources needing only to be found
seems odd.' To believe that there are definitive, primary sources that
contain truth needing only the correct interpretation to be understood is
an amazing phenomenon. It hearkens back to the age of Blackstone and
his belief that law was like a science which lent itself to analysis in the
same way that natural science did.'
By stating that law believes in the existence of absolute authority, I do
not imply that modem theorists of law do not know and appreciate the
absurdity of asserting absolutes. A great body of work has imported
modem concepts of cognitive theory into the law.' Legal theorists are
4. J. Myron Jacobstein & Roy M. Mersky, Fundamentals ofLegal Research xxxiv (5th ed. 1990).
5. Morris L. Cohen & Robert C. Berring, How to Find the Law 377 (8th ed. 1983).
6. Jacobstein & Mersky, supra note 4, devotes three chapters to cases, one to case digests, and one
to annotated law reports. This totals 116 pages of coverage. Federal legislation gets one chapter and
28 pages; state and municipal legislation receive one chapter and 17 pages. Cohen & Berring, supra
note 5, devotes three chapters and 131 pages to cases, case verification and case finding. Legislation
of all sorts receives one chapter and 54 pages. Most legal research courses make heavier use of the
case-based chapters than even these numbers indicate.
7. Patrick Wilson, Secondhand Knowledge: An Inquiry into Cognitive Authority (1983), is a
wonderful introduction to this question. It has an especially useful discussion of the use of authority
in the professions, focusing on law and medicine. Id. at 131-34. In a different way, George Lakoff
and Mark Johnson's Metaphors We Live By (1980) demonstrates some of the same ideas.
8. This period and this idea are explored in Daniel J. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law
(1941). The ideas are directly traceable to Langdell and his followers as well.
9. The work of the prolific Stephen L. Winter, exemplified in Transcendental Nonsense,
Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1105 (1989), is one
example. Robert Cover's Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983), is another.
Indeed, recent interest in Wittgenstein's theories in relation to law is perhaps the ultimate in anti-
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increasingly sophisticated, or should be, about knowledge and language.
Even those who work in the area of doctrinal studies are wiser than the
old absolutist myth would make them appear. Since the demise of
theories of natural law as the undergirding for the common law system,
there has been little theoretical possibility for staking out a common law
apart from the judges who make it and the society in which they live.'0
Holmes knew a century ago that the life of the law is "experience.""
This understanding that the decisions of judges., no less than the
enactments of the legislature, are only uncertain products of human
enterprise, as subjective as any other human creation, makes the
continued focus on marshalling authority in the law even more
impressive. Legal scholars have recognized on an iatellectual level that
there is no grand scheme in the common law, and that the judge who
writes the opinion is not a sage-like being who is only holding up a
nugget of eternal truth but is more likely to be a political appointee
relying on the work of the recent law school graduates who are his clerks
for help. Yet on the practical level legal theorists continue to parse and
analyze cases in much the same manner as their forebears. Therefore the
practice of law has continued to lean heavily on finding, reading, and
relating cases. The profession's obsession with tying cases together has
not abated.
As an example of the legal profession's fixation on the treatment and
importance of cases, consider the Shepard's citation system. The whole
purpose of the Shepard's system, with its obsessior. with tracking each
subsequent citation of a chosen case by a judicial author in a subsequent
absolutisms. See Thomas Morawetz et a]., Wittgenstein and Legal Theory (Dennis M. Patterson ed.,
1992). Even writers on legal research methodology have dealt with this issue. E.g., Steven M.
Barkan, Deconstructing Legal Research: A Law Librarian's Commentary on Critical Legal Studies,
79 Law Libr. . 617 (1987).
10. Examining the prefaces of great common law works demonstrates that traditional common
law scholars saw the system of the common law as built upon a foundation of natural or divine law.
As Blackstone put it:
This law of nature, being [co-equal] with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is of course
superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all countries, and at all
times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid derive
all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately, from this original.
I William Blackstone, Commentaries *41. The structure of the common law was justified by its
conformance with a divinely constructed natural law. This underlying structure was what the judge
was exploring.
11. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (1881).
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case, is to allow the linking of case authority. 2 Legal researchers do not
just look for cases that are overruled or reversed; they seek any mention
of a case that might indicate its growing strength or apparent weakness.
Each case is just an entry point into a network of cross-citations and
clustered references. This ability of a case to wax and wane in authority
should inform the legal researcher that the authority is not absolute, but
still it is seen as such, at least until dethroned by a subsequent judicial
offering. The practice of law continues to treat judicial decisions as
primary sources.
Contributing to the continuance of this system is the pedagogy of legal
education, a central theory of which remains grounded in teaching
students to employ careful reading and rigorous analysis to draw the
abstract principles out of judicial decisions, so that the process of
reasoning and analogy used by the judges and the professors can be
emulated. Building these structures of syllogism becomes paramount for
the law student and is the centerpiece of the system which views its
purpose as training her to think "like a lawyer." Combining judicial
decisions and the Socratic classroom style have been the twin roots of
legal education and legal thinking for 100 years. Nor has the fire died
out. Professor Sunstein's recent article, Commentary: On Analogical
Reasoning, is a modem restatement of the use of the authority of judicial
opinions to create logical structures."3 Legal education has been
constructed on a foundation of abstract legal thought and that thought
was given structure and meaning by the information system that
produced legal publications.
Given the special nature of the role of authority in the law, one can
see why the systems used to locate relevant materials in legal research
take on special urgency. The legal researcher is working through the
very elements, the raw materials, that Langdell felt had to be worked
over by the law student as a part of his "scientific" research. Finding the
case that contained the exact point, the case on "all fours," became an
obsession. Such a case, if from the proper jurisdiction and properly
vetted for continuing vitality via a search of the Shepard's volumes, was
primary authority, a statement of the law itself.
12. Patti Ogden's "Mastering the Lawless Science of Our Law". A Story of Legal Citation
Indexes, 85 Law Libr. J. 1 (1993), is a wonderful tour through the history of Shepard's and how it
came to exercise such power.
13. Cass R. Sunstein, Commentary: On Analogical Reasoning, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 741 (1993).
One could hardly do better than an article by one so respected as Professor Sunstein in the Harvard
Law Review if one wished a statement of the traditional approach eloquently put.
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Because legal researchers are so accustomed to this idea, it is difficult
to realize how unique this concept is in the world of information. In
most fields in the humanities or social sciences, a seaxch of the literature
will reveal certain orthodoxies or prevailing views, certain points in
contention with each side having its own warrior-like adherents, but
there are no points of primary authority. There are no nuggets of truth or
treasure. This explains the fascination of Patrick Wilson in his study of
authority with the situation in the law.14 Legal researchers believe that
there are answers out there that are not just powerfilly persuasive, but
are the law itself.
As mentioned above, this argument appears sensible when made
concerning legislation or even, derivatively, administrative law. Because
the democratically driven law making process allows for legislators to
make law, it would seem that there is absolute law to be found. The law
making process should produce nuggets of absolute law, should it not?
Indeed, the field of legislative history research has developed to assist the
researcher in finding deeper meaning than the words of the statute itself.
Even here, however, cynics have long since pointed out that absolute
meaning and authority are more shadow than stone.15 The idea that the
metonymy that is Congress ever has an intent that can be expressed and
unified is insane. Even assuming that each legislator has a clear and
informed intent at the point When a piece of legislation is voted upon,
which is a real stretch, legislators who vote together may have entirely
different motivations. At times the language of legislation is
intentionally vague or ambiguous just so needed votes from legislators
who are not in complete harmony can be assembled. Often the courts are
needed to give concrete meaning to the language that the legislature has
passed. But when in the process of elucidating the meaning of the words
of the statute, the court presents its findings as a delermination of what
the legislature really meant, it is falling victim to the oldest myths of
legal structure. Such a court is no more revealing the hidden, but extant
14. Wilson, supra note 7.
15. Justice Scalia has become identified with this position. "[L]egislative history . . . is not
merely a waste of research time and ink; it is a false and disruptive lesson in the law." Conroy v.
Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Joan Biskupic, Scalia Sees
No Justice in Trying To Judge Intent of Congress on a Law, Wash. Post, May 11, 1993, at A4. The
first chapter of Frickey and Eskridge's casebook on legislation which describes the genesis of the
Civil Rights Act is also instructive. William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, Cases and Materials
on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy (1988). Peter C. Schanck's The Only
Game in Town: An Introduction to Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construction, and Legislative
Histories, 38 Kan. L. Rev. 815 (1990), is a thoughtful extension of literary theory into this area. It is
an excellent introduction to the literature in this area.
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reality of a mystical congressional intent than the common law judge is
passing on absolute pre-existing tenets of the common law. Some
fascinating studies of legislation are now being produced, and while they
may differ, one common thread is that none contend that the legislature
is creating unalloyed bits of primary authority. Beyond dispute is the
continuing need to give meaning to the authority created by the
legislature.
So again the question returns to the area of judicial opinions, the very
area that is the center of the legal research enterprise. Again this theory
encounters difficulties. What is the judge doing? The system does not
wish to admit that judges make law on their own, but clearly the judges
have no reservoir from which to draw the law. 6 This undeniable Zen
koan explains the recurring obsession in American legal scholarship with
the concept of judicial law making and judicial review. When one tries
to parse out just how this system works rationally, the discussion quickly
degenerates. The best minds continually bang away to try to reconstruct
it, but the fact that they keep trying is evidence that judicial review just
cannot be explained if the traditional myth is accepted as the premise."
But while explaining the theory presents problems, as long as legal
information was controlled in a closed ended system, it would work. In
other words, the great thinkers were seeking an explanation for how such
a system could work through theory, but the answer may well lie in
something as practical as the legal information system itself.
As a driving force behind the legal system, the concept of abstract
legal principles as extruded from the opinions of appellate judges has
survived the succeeding waves of jurisprudential theory crashing on the
beaches of American law. Legal realism, critical legal studies, critical
race theory, and each other variant on the traditional theme laid siege to
the old grand theory of the common law. But the system of legal
research, of finding primary sources and interpreting them as if they are
16. One solution is the structural policing offered by Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and
Interpretation, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 739 (1982). In a striking discussion of the authority of judges,
Professor Fiss says that one reason that judges must be obeyed is that they represent authority. Id. at
755-56. This is as straightforward an avoidance of the problem of how judges make law that the
author has seen and reflects the degree to which cases as authority are internalized. They are
authoritative because they are authoritative.
17. See, e.g., John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980); Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review and
the National Political Process (1980); R. H. Clark, A New Theory of Judicial Review: A Critical
Analysis of John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust, 11 Cap. U. L. Rev. 33 (1981); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 43 (1989); Robert L.
Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review (1989).
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nuggets of absolute authority and truth, survives and flourishes. Though
almost seventy years ago, a commentator such as Cardozo could write:
Adherence to precedent was once a steadying force, the guarantee,
as it seemed, of stability and certainty. We would not sacrifice any
of the brood, and now the spawning progeny, forgetful of our
mercy, are rending those who spared them. Increase of numbers
has not made for increase of respect. The output of a multitude of
minds must be expected to contain its proportio:a of vagaries. So
vast a brood includes the defective and the helpless. An avalanche
of decisions by tribunals great and small is producing a situation
where citation of precedent is tending to count for less, and appeal
to an informing principle is tending to count for more.
18
We continue to base our system of thought around cases. We have not,
at least overtly, turned to Cardozo's "informing principle"; one still finds
string citation to cases everywhere. Two things Cardozo wrote about this
problem are especially noteworthy.
The first is that the situation Cardozo described has worsened a
thousandfold in the intervening years. There is a lot more law now. The
second is that he refers directly to the decision of the American legal
community to print all of its cases, a decision that will be discussed
below. Most important to understand is the contradiction between theory
and practice, and how this can be sustained. The theory of primary
sources and ultimate answers survives because it is so embedded in the
life of the law itself.
Given this unique nature of legal sources, it is important to understand
the way in which lawyers use legal information. I do not mean the way
in which lawyers carry out legal research-we have never been able to
get much of a handle on that-but instead the way in which they
conceptualize and use information. To understand tfis conceptualization
of legal research, it is best to move away from traditional methods and
develop a different model for thinking about legal information. To
accomplish this we introduce the model of an information system.
2. Information Systems
To approach this problem effectively it will help to use the concept of
the information system. An information system i; an ordering of any
form of data in a way that makes it understandable and retrievable.
18. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law 4-5 (1924).
Vol 69:9, 1994
Collapse of the Legal Research Universe
Think of every information system as having two parts. The first part is
the database of information, the second part is the organizing system. No
matter what form of information system one approaches, these two
principles come into play. The information system model can be used to
arrange pure data, or to array objects. It is as complex as an enormous
on-line database, or as simple as one's wallet.
An example may be the best approach to understanding this idea. My
favorite example is one drawn from my son's baseball card collection.
My older son owns several hundred baseball cards. These baseball cards
are the data. So long as my son is content to simply pile the cards up,
there is no need for any external organizing system. Even an apparently
random pile can serve his purposes. Perhaps he has so few cards, or such
a good memory, that he can recall with sufficient specificity what cards
he owns and where in the pile they are. This is not unlike the chronically
messy professor whose office appears to be a chaotic jumble, but who
can find everything. If the database of information, here the boy's
baseball cards, remains manageably small, the finding systems supplied
by his internal organizational system, his memory, will serve. But if my
son accumulates very many cards, or if he wishes to retrieve cards with
greater precision, his memory will not be enough. He will need some
tool, some external organizing system that will allow him to find a
desired card from the mass of cards. The question of how to achieve that
end arises. This is a point of dilemma reached by most information
systems. Database size is the single biggest problem in any information
system.
At this point of the dilemma the question becomes how to array the
data, that is, what organizing system to use so that the system retrieves
what the system user wants. Using my son's cards as an example, how
could he know where and how to find, for example, the card for Dennis
Eckersley, without looking through each card in the stack until luck
served him?
My son did arrive at this dilemma and he asked me for assistance.
Thinking like a lawyer and a librarian, I pointed out to my son that the
company that manufactures the baseball cards had anticipated his need
and provided a perfectly suitable organizing system. In the upper left
hand comer of the back of each card there is a number assigned by the
manufacturer to the card for that particular player or special card. The
numbers run seriatim and allow one to put the cards in numerical order.
The company then prints checklist cards that list the baseball cards by
number and player name, so that one can retrieve a player card by its
unique number. This system seemed rational to me. It allowed for
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comprehensive arrangement of the data with a predictable retrieval
system. It was a system that had been in place for years, and which was
used, with only slight variation, by each company that produces baseball
cards.
My son, unencumbered by training in bibliography or law and
unimpressed by tradition, pointed out that for his purposes there were
many flaws in this arrangement. The numbered arr~angement served no
purpose except for organization. That is, the numbered sequence meant
nothing to him. It also required a double look-up. He first had to consult
the checklist card, then find his player by name, and then find the
numbered card in the sequence. Taking it to another level, he pointed
out several alternative arrangements that served his p~urposes better and
that were single look-up systems. For example, if the cards were
arranged alphabetically by the last name of the player depicted on them,
one could retrieve a desired card by a player's last name without first
going to the checklist to find the proper number. He then suggested that
one might want to have the cards arranged by the position played by the
player, for example, grouping all of the pitchers together, or by the team
affiliation of the player, for example, allowing one to retrieve all of the
Miami Marlins. He then suggested that it might be wise to arrange the
cards by the birth date of each player, or by how proficient the player
was. This process of grouping towards different methods for ordering
the cards continued. At the end of a long list of possible organizing
systems, he suggested the physical attractiveness, or to be more precise,
the ugliness, of the player as pictured on the card. When I pointed out
that each player's ugliness was a subjective judgment, my son pointed
out that it was his set of cards so his judgment was what mattered most.
In these latter arrangements, of course, the name of the player was not so
important as his age, position, team, or attractiveness. Each represented
a separate sorting algorithm. Each was valuable to my son, the system's
user.
What my son had done was reject a pre-coordinated indexing system
that had been created by the baseball card company. A pre-coordinated
index is one in Which the index designer determines an organizing
system that will serve all users. Such systems are built as ways to
organize data and are generally universal. The numbering system
produced by the baseball card company had several strengths that are
normally associated with good, closed ended, pre-coordinated systems.
It was universal, it was comprehensive, and it was easily understood. It
provided a unique location for each card, and, so long as one understood
the Arabic numbering system, one could use it. But it also possessed the
Vol 69:9, 1994
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inherent flaws of such a system. The numerical system was
comprehensive, but in striving to produce a universally applicable system
it ignored the potential idiosyncrasies of its users. This is understandable
because the baseball cards are three dimensional. Because they exist as
objects, and thus can only be put into one arrangement, a pre-coordinated
index has to deal with this problem by putting its data in the most general
possible arrangement. The use of the checklist card method to allow the
user to find a specific player also means that the user must perform a
double look-up, that is, each search will have two stages, each time one
wants to locate a specific card. Double look-ups require extra steps.
Researchers much prefer single-step systems, but as just explained, the
physical form of the data limits the system to one arrangement. The
baseball card company's system was comprehensible to my son, but it
did not meet his needs. The baseball card example proves to be quite
relevant for legal information.
3. Traditional Legal Information Systems
The baseball card example explains a great deal about the systems
used to organize legal information. Think of the system of reporting
judicial opinions. The judicial opinions are the data. When the number
of published cases was small, the organizing system for locating a
specific decision was simple. A lawyer who wished to locate a specific
case relied on the powers of memory to sort information. Daniel
Webster did not need an elaborate external organizing system to order
his data; he used his brain.19 Daniel Webster probably read every case
that was published by every American appellate court, and probably read
English cases as well. Indeed, for the lawyers of his generation the
problem was getting the data, the judicial decisions, at all. Judicial
decisions were published sporadically and idiosyncratically, with no
quality control." Once a lawyer like Webster had found cases, he then
relied on his own memory to store and order them. Of course he might
supplement his memory with his own system of note taking, a personal
and customized organizing system. Webster was finding the data and
19. Researchers continue to pursue the organizing system used within the brain. John R. Searle's
The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992) is a good, if opinionated, summary of current theories. For our
purposes, the process can be a black box.
20. Craig Joyce's The Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on
Marshall Court Ascendancy, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1291 (1985), is a helpful exploration of how
subjective and idiosyncratic the publication of even United States Supreme Court decisions were in
the early nineteenth century.
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using his own internal organizing system to order it. This situation
accounts for the laments of the nineteenth century lawyer about the
avalanche of cases when production of published opinions was, by our
standards, rather modest.2 These lawyers were watching a way of life,
or more accurately, a way of thinking slipping away. In a way, Daniel
Webster parallels my son in his information system. My son's original
set of baseball cards was small enough to be idiosyncratically arranged to
useful ends. The test of any organizing system comes when the database
expands, and that is precisely what happened to the database of cases.
There had been some primitive attempts at creating organizing
systems, but they reflected the small size of the database and the lack of
systematization then common in law. The best k.own of these, called
abridgments, were little more than lists of cases, often in no discernible
order.22 The other major finding tool was the lawyer's notebook, his own
recollection of cases. Because of the relative paucity of books, lawyers
developed a close relationship with printed sources, even pre-dating
Langdell's innovations. Still, this whole system was slipping away in the
second half of the nineteenth century. The database was simply getting
too large. The data cried out for an organizing system.
The West Publishing Company changed the face of legal publishing
and remade the structure of legal thinking by providing one.' West
remade American law with its development of the National Reporter
System and the American Digest System. In events that have been well
chronicled elsewhere, John B. West, the company's founder, decided to
publish every available case in a standard, inexpensive format.24 John
West was not a lawyer or a librarian; he was a salesman. The decision to
publish every available case, instead of publishing only the cases chosen
by a group of legal worthies, as in the way that most reporters then in
existence were constructed, was a marketing choice." But it had
21. J.L. High, What Shall Be Done With The Reports?, 16 Am. L. Rev. 429 (1882), is a classic
lament on the over-publication of cases. What would Mr. High think if he entered a law library
today?
22. A.W.B. Simpson, The Rise and Fall of the Legal Treatise: Legal Principles and the Forms of
LegalLiterature, 48 U. Chi. L. Rev. 632, 636 (1981).
23. Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75
Cal. L. Rev. 15,24-25 (1987).
24. Thomas A. Woxland, "Forever Associated with the Practice of Law": The Early Years of the
West Publishing Company, 5 Legal Reference Services Q. 115, 118-19 (1985). Professor WoxIand
has done significant research on the history of the West Company, and is an excellent source.
25. There is one recorded expression of John West's philosophy. It is to be found in Symposium
of Legal Publishers, 23 Am. L. Rev. 396 (1889). Contrasting West's remarks to those of James
Briggs, an old-style publisher also included in the Symposium, is quite enlightening.
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profound implications. This decision, combined with the continuing
growth of the legal system in the United States, led to a dramatic increase
in the raw number of cases, the database. No longer could anyone's
internal system organize the flood of cases. The memory of all but the
savant was overwhelmed by the sheer size of the database. The Daniel
Webster system of memory and personal notebooks could no longer
prevail. It became impossible for the normal researcher to read all the
cases. A premium would now be placed on systems that helped one
locate cases by subject.
Such a database called for a sophisticated organizing system to make
the information, here the cases, retrievable. West understood this and
bought the rights to the best existing subject classification system in
American law and had experts revise it.26 The product was the American
Digest System with its Topics and Key Number arrangement. The digest
system is a prototype organizing system. It is pre-coordinated in that the
producer, West, has pre-determined what the indexing needs of the user
are. Here West produced a subject breakdown of every possible subject
which could be the topic of an issue of law that could be resolved by a
judge in an appellate decision. In effect, West produced what Daniel
Dabney once called "a universe of thinkable thoughts."'27 No judge could
determine a point that did not have a location in the West system; it was
complete. The conservative aspects of this are obvious." New ideas and
theories are classified back into existing categories. New fields like civil
rights law or feminist jurisprudence are broken apart and dropped into
pre-existing categories. West would add new topics, but only when
absolutely compelled to do so by major changes, and only after the
passage of many years. The system was premised on its stability.
The system is also universal. West published cases from all
jurisdictions in a standard format, abstracted the points of law in a
standard manner and processed them through the digest classification
stream. Only a rudimentary knowledge of the federal nature of
American law is required to recognize how bizarre it is to think that one
26. Erwin C. Surrency's History of American Law Publishing 111-27 (1990) contains a good
account of this interesting process.
27. Daniel P. Dabney used this term in a lecture he gave to my class. His article, The Curse of
Thamus: An Analysis of Full-Text Legal Document Retrieval, 78 Law. Libr. J. 5 (1986), remains one
of the clearest explanations of how a pre-coordinated index works.
28. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?: Law Reform, Critical
Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 207 (1989). See also Robert C.
Berring, Full-Text Databases and Legal Research: Backing into the Future, I High Tech. L.J. 27,
33-37 (1986).
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subject classification system could serve all the states and the federal
system as well. One of the most salient facts about the American federal
system is the difference between the legal systems of jurisdictions. To
apply a uniform subject arrangement to California, Delaware, and New
York is marvelously crazy, and it only grew crazier as the jurisdictions
grew more complex and law played a larger role. But the digest system
prospered, and the only explanation can be that the power of the system
sustained it.29
Of course, the entire West digest system was the product of the end of
the nineteenth century, and it met the needs of th. lawyers of that era.
The system also dovetailed neatly with the model of legal education that
Dean Langdell had installed at Harvard Law School in the 1870s.30 The
major divisions of the digest system's topics mirror the first-year courses
at Harvard, indeed the first-year curriculum at most law schools today.3
Thus, the stamp of the nineteenth century was indelibly placed on
American law. As the digest system became universally accepted, and as
all law schools adopted the Harvard method, these categorizations
became internalized in American law to the point where they now seem
only natural. Recent work in the power o:f categorization and
classification help reveal that any such scheme is no more natural than its
utility.32 But the nineteenth century left another legacy. Like all other
publications from that period, reported decisions were printed on paper,
in a tangible, physical form.
Because the cases and the indexes to them took this physical form,
meaning that they were tangible, they could only be arranged one way.
Recall the baseball card example. It is true that an :individual headnote in
29. This is not to discount the movements at harmonization that characterized the early twentieth
century like the efforts of the American Law Institute or the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws. Those efforts were real but piecemeal and were never related intentionally
into the digest system. They proceeded in a separate universe.
30. See Robert Stevens's Law School: Legal Education in America From the 1850s to the 1980s
(1983) for a discussion of this era.
31. The seven digest topics are: Persons, Property, Contracts, Torts, Crimes, Remedies, and
Government. The first-year curriculum at Boalt Hall, a typical course load for major law schools,
consists of Property, Contracts, Torts, Criminal Law, Civil Procedure, and Constitutional Law.
Remedies are covered in Property, Contracts, and Torts, and Government is covered in Civil
Procedure and Constitutional Law.
32. This is a broad area. An introduction can be gained by reading Social Science Concepts: A
Systematic Analysis (Giovanni Sartori ed. 1984). Extensions of the concept based on Wittgenstein's
concept of "family resemblance" and Lakoff and Johnson's radial categories can be found in David
Collier & J. Mahon, Conceptual Stretching Revisited: Alternative Views of Categories in
Comparative Analysis, 87 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 845 (1993). The bibliography is a rich vein of the
literature in the field.
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a case might be given two addresses in the digest system, but the system
itself, printed on paper, could only take one organizational structure.
The books could only be printed in one order. Using such a system is, of
course, quite different from using one's memory, where the same data
can be organized in a seemingly limitless number of ways. To return for
a moment to my son and his baseball cards, after our discussion of
various organizing systems, I pointed out that he had to choose one. He
pointed out that another solution would be to purchase new sets of
baseball cards and to arrange them by each separate method. While I
declined this offered solution, the same one was available to law.
Anyone else could have taken the body of cases, prepared abstracts and
arranged them in a different system. Indeed, for certain jurisdictions and
certain courts, this was, and is, done. But no one could do it on the scale
of West because of the size and the cost of the enterprise. The West
Publishing Company could have done separate arrangements, but why
would it? West had a pre-coordinated index that they felt covered all of
law in its one arrangement. As time passed and that system became the
accepted standard, West had little reason to doubt its utility. West has
always viewed itself as the servant of the legal profession, not a leader of
it.
One alternative arrangement, the alphabetic arrangement of judicial
opinions by the name of the parties, did come into existence. This piece
of information was easy to collect and could be restated without
tremendous effort and cost. Because the listing was so short, it never
took more than one or two volumes, so that it could be redone alongside
the subject digest volumes. These volumes, known as Table of Cases,
appear in every digest.
The information system based on these West products, supplemented
in an important way by the Shepard's Citations System, allowed the
growing database of cases to be controlled. It also set the tone for legal
research training. The legal information system intertwined itself with
the organization of law itself. Given Langdell's stress on categorizing
the law into inflexible subject areas, and the focus on law as finding
primary sources, the legal information system played an especially
dominant role.33 How one organizes the law became the center of what
the law could and did mean. While this was a conscious process for
Langdell and for West, as time passed legal scholars forgot that choices
had been made and began to see the existing categories as inevitable;
thus the gestalt of case law was created.
33. Christopher Columbus Langdell, A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts vi-vii (1871).
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Until recent years the prevailing paradigm for legal research training
was the finding of cases. Locating relevant precedent, analyzing it,
citing it correctly, and checking its validity were the principal
components of the legal research enterprise. Theugh legislative and
administrative materials may have been acknowledged as primary
sources of law, the bulk of legal research pedagogy was geared toward
cases. Because the case method of instruction has remained firmly
rooted in legal education, this is only sensible. This situation made
sloppy legal research training possible because working with cases was
part of a gestalt process of law school education. The West digest
system was grouping legal concepts into recognizable categories that
were embedded in the courses as taught in the classroom, and which
were in fact part of the intellectual wherewithal of the law school
professor and the judge. Even if the lawyer never really understood how
the digest system operated at a functional level, he could still become
comfortable with its categories. The universe as sketched out by the
West Publishing Company was the only universe available. Once the
student was introduced to Key Numbers, the rest could follow in a fairly
unsystematic way. Secondary sources were indeed secondary and could
be learned as needed, legislation would be organized around cases, and
administrative law would come as needed in practice. Legal research
was a part of the hothouse of legal education: an altificial world where
only the cases, cases arranged and sorted by West for so long that the
arrangement and sorting seemed almost preordained, really mattered.
This explains how legal research training could be allowed to be so
random and poor for so long. For reasons cataloged in incredible detail
elsewhere, legal research training languished.34  Courses in legal
bibliography developed, and there were fights over methodology and
staffing, but the battle was always carried out in an environment where
the course was outside the mainstream of the law student's experience.
Legal research training was thus spotty at best, and the old saw was that
the better the law school, the worse the legal research training program.
(The training program at the Harvard Law School in the fall of 1978 was
34. The heated exchange of articles between Christopher and Jill Wren and Robert Berring and
Kathleen Vanden Heuvel provides both a discussion of the methodology of legal research and a
wealth of footnotes to almost any article ever written on the topic. See Christopher G. Wren & Jill
Robinson Wren, The Teaching of Legal Research, 80 Law Libr. J. 7 (1988); Robert C. Berring &
Kathleen Vanden Heuvel, Legal Research: Should Students Learn It or Wing It?, 81 Law Libr. J.
431 (1989); Christopher G. Wren & Jill Robinson Wren, Reviving Legal Research: A Reply to
Berring and Vanden Heuvel, 82 Law Libr. 1. 463 (1990); Robert C. Berring & Kathleen Vanden
Heuvel, Legal Research: A Final Response, 82 Law Libr. J. 495 (1990). There is no need to reprise
the footnotes here.
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a voluntary one offered by the Board of Student Advisers, a student
group.)
Such a situation developed because legal research was not really
separate from legal thought. The publication and processing of cases
became second nature to the law student through a process akin to
osmosis. When the whole process of professional socialization for the
law student centers on reading, analyzing, and categorizing judicial
opinions, the research methods that help one find such opinions seem
routine and mechanical. The actual location of information was part of
the gestalt process, but only the mechanical part, and one that was simple
enough to be self-taught by a bright person. The prevailing method of
instruction in legal research reinforced this view by relying upon treasure
hunt type exercises, requiring students to look up specific citations and
report back specific findings. This was rote work and was perceived by
the students as such. The courses in legal research suffered.
4. Professor Rombauer's Innovation
Professor Rombauer came upon this scene and upped the intellectual
ante. She designed a program at the University of Washington School of
Law that was premised on the importance of legal research. She saw that
the materials and methods of legal research could not be separated from
the process of analyzing issues and written expression. Her approach to
research recognized the gestalt involved in the research process and
addressed it directly. 5 It used regular faculty and provided an integrated
and intellectually neat approach to the subject. Her textbook remains a
bold statement integrating legal thinking, research and reasoning into a
coherent whole.36 It is different in kind both from the texts that are
bibliographically based and the currently popular process books. It
places legal research into an important context. The Rombauer approach
does not treat legal research training as separate from the rest of the law
student's first-year experience. The legal research process is an inherent
part of the analyzing and categorizing function.
Professor Rombauer's ideas were implemented at the University of
Washington. She set out a curriculum that combined the skills of
research, analysis, and writing and linked it to the rest of the first-year
35. Marjorie Dick Rombauer, First-Year Legal Research and Writing: Then and Now, 25 J. Legal
Educ. 538 (1973).
36. Maijorie Dick Rombauer, Legal Problem Solving: Analysis, Research & Writing (5th ed.
1991).
Washington Law Review
experience. To make such a program work it had to be staffed by regular
faculty. The course had to be, and be seen as, part of the mainstream of
the first-year experience. And so it was. Her plan had the wherewithal
to succeed. But the plan did not work. Teaching legal research is hard
work, calling for a major investment in time from the participating
faculty. The students need individual feedback, and significant amounts
of it, if the course is to succeed. A time commitment of this nature is
very different than that required by the normal large lecture format of the
first-year course, and of course, is quite different from the situation
where the only feedback required from the professor is the one exam to
be graded at the end of the course. Further, the faculty had to understand
both how to carry out effective legal research and appreciate the
pedagogy of the new approach themselves, no mean feat. For Professor
Rombauer's plan to work, the participating faculty would have to
understand the nature of the important shift in theory implied by the
course.
But more than that, such a course did not fit into the traditional model
of legal education. By its nature it was difficult to teach outside the
normal constraints of the Langdellian paradigm. This course was
different from the rest of the curriculum. It was not part of the accepted
universe. Worse yet, it smacked of being clinical in nature, and for all of
the pious words uttered in praise of clinical education, and the repeated
efforts of the American Bar Association to compel the leading law
schools to take clinical education seriously, it remains separate from the
"real" law school experience. Thus there was no glory for the faculty
who participated in the course. They were not seen as important
innovators by their colleagues, and that is not how they viewed
themselves. For all of the hard work and effort that they would invest,
they would be repaid with no credit for "real" work. The continuing
debate over the balance between valuing teaching an1 valuing research in
making promotion and tenure decisions need not be reprised here. It is
enough to observe that where teaching is valued, it is secondary, and that
clinical teaching of the type required by this new course would not
provide anything like an equitable return on faculty time invested. Who
would staff such a course? The natural choice is the junior faculty, those
who do not have tenure, and who need to be most calculating in how
time is spent. It did not take long for faculty to decide that this program
was not worth the effort, and the noble experiment came to an end.
Professor Rombauer took legal research seriously. She listened to the
hortatory language of generations of legal poobahs and designed a course
of study that might actually teach students research in an integrated
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fashion. The experiment that Professor Rombauer initiated provided an
answer to the dilemma of research; she took the problem seriously and
she devised an answer that integrated the finding functions of legal
research into the analytical ones. She also recognized and dealt with the
roles of other source materials. It was a breakthrough.
The problem was that law schools were unwilling to support the
innovation, perhaps even unable to comprehend it. The old system had
enough life to roll on for another generation. The revolution of
electronic information was still on the horizon, perhaps over the horizon,
but Professor Rombauer was able to envision the need for a change in the
way legal research was performed before exigent circumstances made it
absolutely necessary. As long as the gestalt of the case method, and the
prop of the West digest system underwrote the system, it could live on.
Professor Rombauer's program became a legend among those who took
legal research seriously, a legend that demonstrated the stubborn
resistance of the legal education establishment to real solutions to the
problem of legal research.
But now the bill is due. Changes in the last few years have damaged
the traditional legal information system in such a way that we are in the
midst of a major paradigm shift. Legal information is out of control.
The next section will explore why the landscape of legal information has
changed, and why Professor Rombauer has changed from a visionary to
someone who knows how to maneuver the lifeboats.
5. The Present Situation in Legal Information
To understand the current crisis in legal information, we must return
to the model of an information system. The relevant database for legal
information was judicial opinions-judicial opinions as filtered through
the West system. But this has changed and is different in two ways.
The first change is in the sheer number of judicial opinions. This is
important because the size of the database makes a material difference.
It is estimated by West that 60,000 cases entered into its printed reporter
systems last year. Perhaps another 40,000 appeared exclusively in an
electronic format.37 There is no printed organizing system (at least none
with the complexity of the National Reporter System and the American
Digest System) that can handle that much input without becoming
unmanageable. To be blunt, there is just too much stuff. The American
37. This estimate was given by Dorothy MoIstead, Production Manager at West Publishing, to the
author in the spring of 1992.
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Digest System was designed in an era when less than a thousand cases a
year were published. Even then the prospect of L thousand cases was
viewed as a dangerous amount of information. Remember that lawyers
and judges in the late nineteenth century felt overwhelmed by cases. It is
a tribute to the old system that it weathered the storms of data for this
long, but it has begun to crack. Digest volumes are growing at a
frightening pace; the West Company must issue its Decennial Digest in
two parts, one coming out every five years, because the sheer volume of
a ten year cumulation would be absurd. An even more graphic example
is the West Federal Digest System. The Federal Digest lasted until 1940,
when it was closed. The Modem Federal Practice Digest covers more
than twenty years, but the current iterations will be! lucky to contain the
cases in ten year blocks. The federal digests are becoming decennials.
But even if the printed volumes could accommodate the system, the
volume of published cases is breaking down the intellectual structure of
the system, weakening what we have called the gestalt of legal thought.
No order can be brought to such chaos. Where the research enterprise
once consisted of finding a relevant precedent or two and exploring the
universe of cases around them, now each side in any dispute can find
bunches of relevant cases. String citations to great gobs of cases are
typical, and briefs continue to expand, each page packed with "relevant"
authority. Whatever linear nature precedent could once claim is now
gone. It is not surprising; no system could survive so much data and stay
in the rigid control that was typical of the West digest system.
The second major change in the pattern of legal information is the
advent of the full-text on-line research systems: Westlaw and LEXIS.
At a basic level, these systems added nothing new; they simply took
information that had been contained in books and transferred it to
electronic form. But beyond that basic fact, there are several profound
ways in which the on-line databases change the legal information system.
First, the information is no longer stored in one place in one way. The
database no longer has a three dimensional, tangible quality to it. The
nature of electronic information is that it is stored in a manner dictated
by the machine environment, and can be recalled in as many ways as one
designs into the system. This means that one cart pull up parts of the
database, or the entire thing, in a variety of arrangements limited only by
the system's design and the searcher's creativity.
Recall the baseball card example. If my son had his collection of
baseball cards in an electronic format, complete with stored pictures of
the players, and if he had equipment with color display ability and good
search software he would escape all of his organizational problems. He
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could recall particular cards by name, by team, by position, by birth date,
indeed, by any system of tagging that the company which produced the
cards had built in, and perhaps by some personal systems that he could
create. The barrier presented by a single physical manifestation of each
card is now gone. This is what happened to cases. The physical
representation of the cases is no longer in control, indeed, the electronic
representation of the cases now controls the finding systems. The cases
can be retrieved in whatever variety of ways the researcher decides to be
useful, and no one system has to dominate.
There was early debate over whether this method of storage of legal
information precluded reliable citation of the material, since it now did
not exist in three dimensional form. Understanding that the information
contained in a judicial opinion was just as valid when stored
electronically called for an adjustment in attitude about what information
was "real."38 Given the long term dependence of the law upon its books,
it is hardly surprising that many lawyers on the far side of a legal
information generation gap feel that information has to be printed on
paper to be real. The ultimate arbiter of reality in law, the Uniform
System of Citation, went through several iterations ignoring the on-line
systems before they were incorporated. Now each database has its own
system of internal citation. As more and more lawyers come from the
new generation of information users who see information, whether on
paper or in electronic format, as fungible, the storage in non-tangible
form will seem increasingly natural.
A further elaboration of this change is the growth in the use of non-
judicial source materials. As the world has changed, and as the coin of
judicial precedent has been debased by overpublication, the use of non-
judicial sources has increased. Legislation is now at the center of the
research endeavor, and it shares center stage with administrative
materials. Westlaw and LEXIS make legislative and administrative
materials available in profusion and solve the difficulties that used to be
inherent in researching the latter especially. Materials that were once
held in the sub-basements of only the best law libraries are now as easily
retrieved on LEXIS and Westlaw as a Supreme Court decision.
International materials are also increasingly available. The same is true
38. The fact that only printed information is seen as being "real" relates to deep cultural biases.
See Geoffrey Nunberg, The Places of Books in the Age of Electronic Reproduction, 42
Representations 13 (1993), for background. "'The book' here stands in a metonymy for all of the
material circumstances of print culture...." Id. at 15. Ethan Katsch sets out some of the same ideas
in The Electronic Media and the Transformation of Law (1989), and expands them in Law in a
Digital World: Computer Networks and Cyberspace, 38 Viii. L. Rev. 403 (1993).
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of secondary sources and even non-legal research sources. The
researcher who turns on her LEXIS subscription today is the virtual
equivalent of the researcher walking into the Harvard Law Library in
1960. The rare materials are not there, but much non-legal information
is, and it is a good trade-off. Thus the databases have expanded the
literature that is easily accessible."
In addition to the possibilities for tagging the cases in the database
with all manner of hooks to extract it, LEXIS and Westlaw provide the
researcher with the capacity to perform word searches on the full text
database using Boolean logic. The tool of Boolean logic, when
combined with the existence of the full text of judicial opinions, means
an entirely different form of organizational logic can be brought to bear
to find materials. Boolean logic allows the researcher to look for specific
words or combinations of words in a document, specifying proximity if
desired.4" By allowing the user to search for specific terms or roots in
combination with other terms or roots, or in specified proximity to them,
a whole new logic of organizing the legal information system has been
introduced. Instead of a pre-coordinated index in:o which all data is
funneled, the database now stands open for post-coordinated indexing by
the searcher. An adept Boolean searcher can specify terms and
combinations of terms that allow her to create her own subset of opinions
based on her own criteria. And each foray into the database is new. The
searcher is empowered to carry out a new post-publication reorganization
of the database each time she searches. Thus there i,; no longer a need to
rely on the West system to organize information before it reaches the
researcher; the researcher can go to the database whenever she wishes
and create a new search algorithm each time.
This is not to contend that many researchers are adept at Boolean
searching.4" It remains a difficult task, but the possibility of escaping
from the old system is now real. More importantly, the old paradigm is
not the only way to understand the law. One does not have to be a part
of the "gestalt" any longer; the new system has a plasticity and vibrancy
all its own. The magnitude of this change cannot be understood solely
39. There are also signs of change in the Langdellian model of legal education that comprises the
other half of the case law gestalt. That change is the subject of another -xticle, but it seems that after
110 years of ascendancy, legal education may be willing to back off the reading and analysis of
appellate cases as the only way to train new professionals.
40. Anyone feeling the need of a fuller description of Boolean logic is referred to footnote 7 in
Berring, supra note 28, at 28, which provides more background than one really needs.
41. Berring, supra note 23, at 26-27; Berring, supra note 28, at 38-39; Dabney, supra note 27, at
18-20.
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by examining the area of legal research; rather it must be seen in the
context of the greater question of how we think about the law. Once
both on-line systems began to supply each student at each ABA
accredited law school with free passwords with 24-hour access, the
whole pattern of law student information use changed.
Part of this change is due to the generation gap in information use.
The typical law student of today is not a product of the culture of the
book and is just as likely to use an electronic source as a print source.
But a large part of it is the convenience of use. LEXIS, with its glorious
NEXIS database offering full-text access to a world of legal and non-
legal information, is especially seductive to the student.
This form of access breaks the gestalt because the students no longer
must work within the constraints of the West digesting system. Indeed,
students no longer need to even come to Langdell's laboratory of the
law, the library, to work. They can do it via modem from home. Thus,
the last vestiges of control imposed by the West system, the last form of
the glue of subject structure, is gone. In May of 1993 there was a debate
about electronic legal research among law librarians on the electronic
bulletin board used as a forum by law librarians.42 On one side were the
professionals who felt that it was crucial to train first-year law students in
using paper research. On the other side were the professionals who felt
electronic research was inevitable. A common assumption on both sides
was that students preferred using the on-line systems. Issues of cost,
sloppiness, and vendor control raged, but no one doubted what the mass
of students preferred. In a telling analogy, Charles Ten Brink of the
University of Chicago Law Library opined that librarians urging the law
students to use the old paper-based systems for legal research were like
people urging folks to eat vegetables at a buffet, while the LEXIS and
Westlaw representatives were offering them a table of Big Maes and
Twinkies. The students want to use the on-line systems.
6. The New World of Legal Research Training
This profound change in the nature of the legal information system
produces a similarly crucial change in the environment of research
training. No longer can the sloppy methodologies of the past be
accepted. Students cannot learn research through the osmosis of constant
exposure to the gestalt of case theory; they must approach it as a
42. The bulletin board is called law-lib and is an Internet bulletin board run out of the University
of California at Davis Law Library.
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systematic enterprise. No longer is the universe limited to judicial
opinions. Now the world consists of legislation, administrative
materials, practice tools, factual materials, and a world of uncontrolled
sources. No longer is legal research the hothouse environment that it
once was. Yet legal education has been slow to respond to this
challenge. It is amazing that in 1993 law students still read casebooks,
desiccated collections of appellate opinions. But rather than being the
introduction to the old world of the case categorizations of West, the
textbooks now are the last bastion of the case gestalt. The rest of the
research world is changing. And much of this change is reflected in the
research training that the law students receive, and the way in which they
receive it.
The biggest practical change has come from LEXIS and Westlaw.
Each vendor realized that the best method to popularize its system was to
have people use it when they were students. Taking a long term view,
each vendor determined to underwrite, at a significant loss, programs to
introduce law students to its system. An enormous amount of free
equipment was given to law school libraries in the form of permanent
learning centers and to law schools in the form of local area network
support for faculty. Each vendor provides documentation in a variety of
formats and maintains national staffs of academic representatives to
provide and coordinate the in-person training of law students. For many
American law students the only common research training experience
they receive is the training provided by LEXIS and Westlaw, a training
experience that will follow the student into practice if he or she works in
a large law firm environment.43
These high quality research guides, incentive-driven training
programs, and specialized training modules are only the beginning. The
vendors also provide 24-hour 800 telephone numbers, that allow the user
to consult with an expert attorney/database searcher for research help or
advice. The vendors even allow free printing on law library machines
and underwrite the cost of paper and ink to the law libraries. 44 These
43. Some law schools, like Boalt Hall, allow the vendor representative; to train first-year students.
This is based on the adversary system concept that each should provide the best view of their own
product. Other schools, like USC, exclude the vendor representatives on the theory that they are
biased. Still, the amount of resources spent per student on on-line training by the vendors is several
quantums beyond what any law school can, or will, spend.
44. LEXIS spent $600,000 in 1992 on paper and ink alone. Wayne Greenberg, then the
coordinator of academic programs at LEXIS, provided this figure during a speech at the Twentieth
Anniversary Celebration Conference in Dayton in April, 1993. It is worth noting that Mr.
Greenberg, a former Associate Dean at Tulane Law School, was hired away from academia by
LEXIS to head up this program.
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massive investments look especially impressive when compared with the
tiny amounts most schools commit to the research and writing program
that they offer, and, as Professor Dunn has recently discussed so
eloquently, the majority of those resources go to the teaching of legal
writing.4
5
The biggest change of all, however, has been the distribution of free
24-hour home use passwords to law students. Each law student at each
accredited law school that subscribes can get such a number. The
number can be used via a modem to gain access to LEXIS or Westlaw
wherever and whenever the student wishes. The student no longer must
come into the library to use a computer dedicated to the legal research
database. The student can sit at home and work on his computer via a
modem. The law student in 1993 is freed from the subject constraints of
the old case law gestalt, and from the physical constraint of having to go
to the information. Information is no longer in discrete book form, and
one need not travel to consult it.
The nature of legal research has changed. Under the old system,
sloppy research instruction was not fatal. The student could blunder
along, safe in the controlled environment. Research was an intricate part
of analysis. This explains the grouping of research, writing, and analysis
into one course at many law schools. The purely mechanical aspects of
research, of finding the right book, were minimal. But this is no longer
the case. Now the research environment is rich, and getting richer. The
on-line databases are not the last word-the scene of legal publication is
shifting rapidly. Given the plethora of choices now available to the
researcher, how can one know what to do? What is clear is that intuitive,
on-the-fly searching, supported by the familiar law of the digest system
and West's world view is impossible. We now need research training
that is devoted to research skills, that sees those skills as useful and vital.
Finding information, information of all sorts, not just cases, will be a
vital function of the twenty-first century lawyer.
The world where legal research training could be forgotten because
the law student or young lawyer would learn it "on the job" is gone.
Finding materials, and carrying out good searches, are important skills.
Legal education had better start paying attention to them.
Professor Rombauer's ideas are still there, and still look like a fresh
approach to these questions. The need for an integrated first-year
research course, staffed by faculty and providing training in the methods
45. Dunn, supra note 1, at 55-56.
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of twenty-first century research combined with the skills of analysis and
writing has never been clearer. This is not a course where the teaching
responsibility can be handed to second- and third-year law students; it
needs tenure track faculty. For participating faculty this will mean a
requisite education in twenty-first century research skills, but what could
be more appropriate? Perhaps it is time that legal research lead the way
in the first year of law school. Legal education should see that rather
than being a visionary, Professor Rombauer has become a savior.
7. Conclusion
Professor Rombauer saw research as a fulcrum around which to turn
the law school experience. She saw that it required full time faculty and
serious resources. She saw that it could not be taught by second- and
third-year law students who only know what they had learned from other
second- and third-year law students. To meet these needs she designed
an innovative program. The world was not yet ready. Legal education
was not prepared to escape from its old paradigm. Now, the time has
come. In the midst of an information revolution that it cannot stop and
seems hardly to understand, the legal profession must reassess the very
way it thinks about legal research and legal research training. It would
be appropriate to use the vision of Professor Rombauer as an inspiration
and guide as we go about trying to solve this puzzle.
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